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Abstract
Systemic crises can have grave consequences for investors in international equity
markets, because it causes the risk-return trade-off to deteriorate severely for a longer
period. In this paper we propose a novel approach to include the possibility of
systemic crises in asset allocation decisions. By combining regime switching models
with Merton (1969)-style portfolio construction, our approach captures persistence
of crises much better than existing models. Our analysis shows that incorporating
systemic crises has a large impact on asset allocation decisions, while the costs of
ignoring such crises are substantial. For an expected utility maximizing US investor,
who can invest globally these costs range from 1.13% per year of his initial wealth
when he has no prior information on the likelihood of a crisis, to over 3% per month
if a crisis occurs with almost certainty. If a crisis is taken into account, the investor
allocates less to risky assets, and particularly less to emerging markets, being most
prone to a crisis. An investor facing short selling constraints withdraws completely
from equity markets if the likelihood of a crisis increases.
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1 Introduction
Systemic crises can wreak havoc on national and international financial systems, making
these crises an important issue for study. De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and Dow (2000)
provide excellent surveys on the characteristics and causes of systemic crises for the different
financial markets, including banking, currency, credit and equity markets. In this article we
focus on the consequences of systemic crises for investors in international equity markets.
International investors suffer from the deterioration of the risk and return characteristics,
as systemic crises exhibit a sharp drop in returns, an upswing in volatilities and a rise of
the correlations between financial markets on a global scale. Evidence of this behavior has
been based on the October 1987 stock market crash, and the crises that originated from the
emerging markets in the 1990s (e.g. the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997 and
the Russian crisis of 1998).1 Due to their irregular and rare occurrence, standard models
that investors use to support their asset allocation decisions typically fail to account for
systemic crises, resulting in suboptimal international asset allocations.
The implications of systemic crises for equity portfolios have been studied by Das and
Uppal (2004), who conclude that they are limited. However, their approach assumes that
a systemic crises is a short-lived event that is hardly persistent. On the contrary, recent
crises and their aftermaths have lasted several months, indicating persistence. If the risk-
return trade-off deteriorates for a longer period, the impact of systemic crises for investors
will be more severe. In order to include possible persistence, we propose to investigate this
issue by means of a regime switching model in the style of Ang and Bekaert (2002), which
we combine with optimal portfolio construction as set out by Merton (1969, 1971). This
approach allows us to model the behavior of asset returns on a regime by regime basis,
making it both simple and flexible. Formulating and solving the asset allocation problem
in continuous time ensures analytical tractability.
We distinguish among two strategies that a utility-maximizing investor can adopt to
solve his asset allocation problem: a crisis conscious and a crisis ignorant strategy. The
crisis conscious strategy includes a systemic crises as a distinct regime in which all markets
encounter a shock, while the crisis ignorant strategy does not. For both strategies, we
construct optimal portfolios. By comparing the portfolios we assess the implications and
importance of a systemic crisis. For a US-based global investor, who can invest in stock
markets in the US, Europe, Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Korea and Brazil, and a riskless
asset, we find that the crisis conscious strategy leads to a reduction of the investments in
risky assets and a shift to countries less prone to a crisis. A small probability of a crisis
(of say 5%) already causes these adjustments, and they quickly become more pronounced
if the probability increases. Ignoring a crisis is costly, as the investor requires a certainty
equivalent return of 1.13% per year as a compensation if he has no information on the
1For research directly aimed at the October 1987 crash we refer to Roll (1988, 1989), Bertero and
Mayer (1990) and King and Wadhwani (1990). Calvo and Reinhart (1996) discusses the Mexican crisis,
Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) and Baig and Goldfajn (1999) investigate the Asian crisis, while Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2002) cover the Asian and Russian crises. A more general overview is given in De Bandt
and Hartmann (2000).
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ex-ante probability of a crisis. If the investor knows with almost certainty that a crisis
occurs, this compensation can easily exceed 3% per month.
We make several contributions to the literature investigating the influence of extreme
returns and regime switches on asset allocation. We extend the analysis of Das and Uppal
(2004) in three important aspects. First, our model is better able to capture the persistence
of a crisis, because we include a systemic crisis as a distinct regime in a regime-switching
model, while they incorporate it by adding a perfectly correlated jump to a geometric
Brownian motion.2 Second, we analyze the impact of systemic crises in a dynamic setting,
which can adapt to changes in the behavior of asset prices. Third, our model without a crisis
is more realistic, as the model proposed by Das and Uppal implies a normal distribution
with constant means and variances. We also extend the work of Liu et al. (2003) by showing
the effects of systemic crises on diversification, while their model is limited to a univariate
setting with one risky asset only. Our finding that persistence is an important aspect of
systemic crisis is consistent with their results. Our approach is complementary to Ang and
Bekaert (2002, 2004), who consider international asset allocations in a regime-switching
framework, as we use a similar framework to concentrate on the effects of systemic crises.
Because of the severity of the crisis regime, we find larger effects of regime switches on
diversification. As another extension to their work we show how the resulting allocation
problem can be solved in continuous time.
In a broader sense our study can be seen as an investigation of the hypothesis that
diversification advantages fail to be realized due to increasing correlations during market
downturns, such as systemic crises. This claim has been put forward by various authors3,
but it is not clear how strong this effect is. Ang and Chen (2002) conclude that the costs of
ignoring increasing correlations during bear markets are substantial, but Ang and Bekaert
(2002) find that diversification advantages remain present. In our approach, an increase
in correlations is inherent in a crisis4. If the probability with which a crisis hits increases,
diversification possibilities erode rapidly and cause large divestments. If the investor faces
short sales constraints, he completely withdraws from equity markets.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss how the crisis conscious
and crisis ignorant strategies produce optimal portfolios and how the portfolios can be
compared. Section 3 presents the actual design of the study, including the data. We
discuss the estimation results in section 4, and derive and and compare the allocations
produced by the different strategies in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2In a related paper, Das and Uppal (2003) also consider a regime switching model to allow for stronger
persistence and conclude that it does not change their main conclusions. However, the degree of persistence
they consider is fairly low compared to our analysis. For higher levels of persistence systemic crises are
likely to have more severe consequences, which is also indicated by the result in Das and Uppal (2003)
that the effects of systemic crises are increasing and convex for increasing levels of persistence.
3See, for instance, Boyer et al. (1999); Loretan and English (2000); Longin and Solnik (2001); Campbell
et al. (2002); Ang and Chen (2002); Ang and Bekaert (2002); Campbell et al. (2003).
4It is widely discussed whether the tendency of markets to move downward together is a form of
contagion or can be explained by joint shocks (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Corsetti et al., 2005).
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2 A crisis conscious and a crisis ignorant strategy
The investor can adopt two strategies to construct an optimal portfolio: a crisis conscious
and a crisis ignorant strategy. As their main ingredients, both strategies contain a model
for the return process and a formulation of the asset allocation problem as their main
ingredients. In both cases, a Markov regime switching model is applied to describe the
return process. We prefer regime switching models to models with jump components, since
the first offer more flexibility to capture heteroskedasticity and fat tails5. The difference
between the strategies is the presence of distinct crisis regimes in the model employed by
the crisis conscious strategy. The model in the crisis ignorant strategy can be interpreted
as a restricted version of that in the crisis conscious strategy.
We assume that the investor formulates and solves his asset allocation problem in an
expected utility, continuous time framework. Because of the continuous time approach,
the problem has a closed-form solution, contrary to the numerical approach of Ang and
Bekaert (2002). The different models for the return process will lead to different allocations
for the two strategies. Because the investor constructs his asset allocation under expected
utility, we can determine the economic importance of those differences by calculating the
certainty equivalent return needed to compensate the investor if he incorrectly uses the
crisis ignorant strategy.
In the first subsection, we discuss the models for the return process. In the next one,
we formulate and solve the investor’s asset allocation problem. Subsection 3 shows how
the continuous time return process in the model of the asset allocation problem should be
constructed to make it consistent with the predictions resulting from the Markov regime
switching models. In subsection 4 we derive the compensation (as certainty equivalent
return) that the investor requires if he incorrectly adopts the crisis ignorant strategy. We
conclude by showing how the differences between the allocations of the crisis conscious and
crisis ignorant strategies can be explained.
2.1 Regime switching models for the return process
We start with the more general model that is used in the crisis conscious strategy, and
consider the restricted version in the crisis ignorant strategy subsequently. The general
model for the return process consist of several regimes. The behavior of the return process
within a regime corresponding to a normal period is made up of basic components, while
its behavior within a regime corresponding with a systemic crisis contains both basic and
crisis components. By choosing this setup, a systemic crisis can be clearly interpreted as
a simultaneous shock to all assets, which comes on top of the normal behavior of an asset.
We assume that the investor can invest in n assets.
5Timmermann (2000) shows that regime switching models can imply higher order moments that are
more in accordance with the fat tails in asset returns that have been documented by Longin (1996).
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) show that regime switching models can capture the autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity in returns.
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First, consider the set of states that apply to the return process. We assume that each
asset i’s basic return component can be in one regime Qi from a set of K regimes. For the
crisis component two regimes Qc are available: presence (Qc = 1) and absence (Qc = 0),
and since the crisis is systemic the crisis regime applies to all assets. Consequently, the
state that applies to the joint returns, Q˜, is completely defined by the combination of each
asset’s basic regime and the crisis regime6:
Q˜ ≡ (Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn, Qc). (1)
We use Q to denote the combination of basic regimes, Q ≡ (Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn). The sets Q
and Q˜ collect all possible state vectors Q and Q˜, respectively. The actually prevailing state
will never be known with certainty. Instead, each state prevails with a certain probability,
inferred from the data.
The return vector can be split into a basic component and a crisis component. We
assume that for each state Q ∈ Q the basic component x is a normally distributed random
vector, characterized by a state-specific mean µQ and variance matrix ΩQ. The marginal
distribution of asset i’s basic component depends only on the regime Qi that applies. The
crisis component consists of a shock, represented by a univariate random variable xc, to
which each asset has a specific sensitivity δi. Following Das and Uppal (2004) and Liu et al.
(2003) we assume that the shock has a normal distribution, with mean µc and variance ωc.
Combining the two components gives the return vector:
r = x+Qcxcδ, Qc ∈ {0, 1}, (2)
where δ is the vector of sensitivities. Conditional on the state Q˜ ∈ Q˜, the return is normally
distributed, being the sum of two (conditionally) normally distributed variables. Under
the assumption that the shock and the basic component are independent, the mean vector
µQ˜ and variance matrix ΩQ˜ of the return can be written as:
µQ˜ = µQ +Qcµcδ, (3)
ΩQ˜ = ΩQ +Qcωcδδ
′ (4)
Because we want the shock to have the same direction for each asset, we require δi ≥ 0 for
each i. Consequently, each variance and covariance term will increase if Qc = 1.
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The final element we add to the model are the transition probabilities that govern the
Markov chains that the regime processes follow. We assume that the transition probabilities
are constant over time, but we deviate from the two common approaches in the literature of
either estimating each probability as a free parameter or assuming independence between
the transition probabilities for the different assets. The first approach would lead to a
6We use the expression state to refer to a combination of the basic regimes and the crisis regimes.
7The correlation will rise if the relative increase in covariance exceeds the product of relative increase in
volatilities. This condition will generally be satisfied for correlations not too close to 1. In our model this
change in correlation is completely due to the occurrence of a crisis. Consequently, using the terminology
of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), our model implies interdependence of assets but not contagion.
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very large number of unknown parameters (n assets than can each be in K regimes and
encounter a crisis lead to 2Kn · (2Kn − 1) parameters), while the second approach implies
the absence of volatility spill-over effects, being the tendency of high volatility in one asset’s
return to spread to other assets.8 Given the evidence in favor of volatility spill-over this
implication is too restrictive. Therefore, we choose a different approach.
Let piab denote the conditional probability of a switch to state Q˜a, given that the current
state is Q˜b. First, we impose a structure based on the crisis regime.
• If a crisis occurs neither in the current state (Qcb = 0) nor in the destination state
(Qca = 0), we model pi
ab as the product of the marginal conditional probabilities
pii(Q
a
i |Q˜b) and the conditional probability that a crisis does not occur, given the
current state Q˜b. Here, piabi gives the probability that asset i switches to regime
Qai , given that the current state is Q˜
b. The dependence on the state Q˜b instead
of the asset-specific regime Qbi introduces dependence across assets and enables the
incorporation of volatility spill-over effects. We use a multinomial logistic model to
model this dependence, which we discuss in the appendix.9
• If a crisis occurs in the destination state (Qca = 1), but does not occur in the current
state (Qcb = 0), we restrict the transitions such that the regime processes for the
assets switch to the regime with the highest volatility. This restriction imposes that
global stress triggers local stress.
• For the case that a crisis occurs both in the current and the destination state, we
impose the same restriction as in the previous case. It prohibits illogical switches
from high volatility regimes to lower volatility regimes, while a crisis remains present.
• If the assets currently encounter a crisis (Qcb = 1), which disappears in the destination
state (Qac = 0), the basic regime processes remain in the highest volatility regimes
in the next period. After that, they can switch to other regimes. This restriction
captures a gradual cooling down of assets after a crisis.
Finally, we assume that the crisis transition probabilities are independent of the asset-
specific regimes. This leads to two parameters for the crisis transition probabilities: pi10c ,
the probability that a crisis occurs in the destination state, but did not occur in the
current state, and pi11c , the probability that a crisis occurs in both the current state and
the destination state. If we assume without loss of generality that the regimes are ordered
in ascending order of volatility, we can represent our model as follows:
8Several authors have established volatility spill-over effects for different markets: Hamao et al. (1990)
for the US, UK and Japan; Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and Ng (2000) for the US, Japan, and other
Pacific-Basin markets; Edwards and Susmel (2001) for emerging markets in Asia and Latin America; Lee
et al. (2004) for the US and Asian markets; and Baele (2005) for European countries.
9Bae et al. (2003) use a related model to investigate contagion.
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piab =

piab1 · piab2 · · · piabn · (1− pi10c ) if Qac = 0, Qbc = 0
pi10c if Q
a
c = 1, Q
b
c = 0,∀i Qai = K
pi11c if Q
a
c = 1, Q
b
c = 1,∀i Qai = K
1− pi11c if Qac = 0, Qbc = 1,∀i Qai = K
0 otherwise
(5)
The crisis ignorant strategy imposes the restriction that transitions to Qac = 1 have
zero probability. The consequences of this restriction are twofold. First, the crisis ignorant
strategy will lead to different inferences and forecasts about the prevailing regime. Second,
if the investor incorrectly follows an ignorant strategy and estimates the parameters of
the process, the estimates for the parameters (both the distribution parameters and the
transition matrix) are likely to be biased.
2.2 The asset allocation problem
The investor is risk averse and maximizes his utility over terminal wealth WT . We assume
he has a power utility function:
U(WT ) =
W 1−γT
1− γ , γ > 0, γ 6= 1, (6)
where γ is the investor’s coefficient of relative risk aversion10. To focus on the effect of a
systemic crisis on asset allocation, we do not allow intermediate consumption. As such, our
analysis is comparable to other studies such as Ang and Bekaert (2002), Liu et al. (2003)
and Das and Uppal (2004). The investor can trade in continuous time. At each point in
time t he will choose to invest proportions of his wealth in the n risky assets, collected in
the vector φt and the remaining part 1−φ′tιn in the riskless asset (ιn being a vector of size
n with ones) in order to maximize expected utility:
max
{φt,0≤t≤T}
E0 [U(WT )] . (7)
We assume that the investor has an initial endowment W0. This assumption and a
process for the asset prices enables us to derive the investor’s self-financing constraint,
which describes the dynamics of the wealth process. As we will describe below, we use
a specific Itoˆ process in continuous time that is consistent with the discrete time return
process described in the previous section. For the moment, let the (multivariate) Itoˆ process
be given by:
dr = µdt+ ΛdZ, (8)
10For γ = 1 the utility function is defined as log utility U(WT ) = lnWT .
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where µ ≡ µ(r, t) is the vector of instantaneous drift rates, which can depend on the return
up to time t and time itself, Λ ≡ Λ(r, t) is a lower triangular n×n matrix that can also be
a function of r and t, and dZ is a vector of n independent Wiener processes. Consequently,
the instantaneous variance rate Ω is given by Ω = ΛΛ′. The process for asset prices can be
derived by applying Itoˆ’s lemma to the exponential relation between returns and prices:
dS =
(
µ+ 1
2
diag(Ω)
)
Sdt+ ΛSdZ, (9)
where diag(Ω) denotes a column vector containing the diagonal elements of Ω. The riskless
asset pays the risk-free rate rf . The self-financing condition reads:
dW
W
= rfdt+ φ
′αdt+ φ′ΛdZ, (10)
where α ≡ µ+ 1
2
diag(Ω)− rf ιn11.
The asset allocation problem constituted by Eq. (7) and (10) can be solved using stan-
dard stochastic control techniques12. We start with the indirect utility function:
V (W, t) = max
φs,t≤s≤T
Et[U(WT )]. (11)
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation takes the form:
max
φ
(
∂V
∂t
+ (rf + αφ
′)W
∂V
∂W
+ 1
2
φ′ΩφW 2
∂2V
∂W 2
)
= 0. (12)
We conjecture (and verify) that the indirect utility function is of the form:
V (W, t) = C(t)
W 1−γ
1− γ , γ 6= 1. (13)
Based on this functional form13, we derive expressions for the derivatives in Eq. (12) and
substitute them. We can now differentiate Eq. (12) with respect to φ, and solve the first-
order condition to find the optimal portfolio weights for the risky assets φ∗:
φ∗ = γ−1Ω−1α = γ−1Ω−1
(
µ+ 1
2
diag(Ω)− rf ιn
)
. (14)
Though this expression has the same structure as the solution to a standard mean-variance
optimization problem, both µ and Ω will be shown to depend on time and the observed
returns, making the weights depending on them as well. This expression also applies to
the log-utility investor.
11The expression can be interpreted as an excess, arithmetic mean return.
12See for example Le´onard and Van Long (1992).
13For γ = 1 we use V = ln[C(t)W ].
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2.3 The Itoˆ process for returns
Brigo (2002) describes a way to derive continuous time processes whose corresponding
density at a certain point in time is a mixture of densities from the same family14. This
approach has two advantages. First, it facilitates the use of the powerful techniques devel-
oped for continuous time finance. Second, the continuous time processes that result from
his approach include the different regimes directly in their parameters without introducing
extra state variables for the different regimes. Consequently, the regimes are implicitly
present in the portfolio optimization (i.e. in the parameters of the Itoˆ process), and do not
lead to regime-specific Itoˆ processes.
Since the distribution of rτ+1 conditional on its filtration is a mixture of normal distri-
butions (see Hamilton, 1994, Ch. 22), we can apply a multivariate extension of Theorem 2
in Brigo (2002). Consequently, the Itoˆ process in Eq. (8) starting at t0 = τ with rt0 = 0 has
a mixture density at time τ +1 which corresponds with the mixture model implied by the
regime switching model, if the instantaneous drift rate µ(r, t) and instantaneous variance
rate Ω(r, t) are given by:
µ(r, t) =
∑
Q˜∈Q˜
pi(Q˜, r, t)µQ˜ (15)
Ω(r, t) =
∑
Q˜∈Q˜
pi(Q˜, r, t)ΩQ˜ (16)
with
pi(Q˜, r, t) =
ξτ+1|τ (Q˜) · f
(
rt;µQ˜(t− τ),ΩQ˜(t− τ)
)
∑
Qˆ∈Q˜ ξτ+1|τ (Qˆ) · f
(
rt;µQˆ(t− τ),ΩQˆ(t− τ)
) , (17)
where τ < t ≤ τ + 1, and ξτ+1|τ (Q˜) = Pr(Q˜τ+1|Fτ ) gives the forecast probability that
state Q˜ is prevailing at time τ + 1.15 Λ(r, t) can then be found by applying a Cholesky
decomposition to Ω(r, t). For t = τ , Eq. (17) reduces to pi(Q˜, 0, τ) = ξτ+1|τ (Q˜).
The drift and variance rate constructed by Eq. (15), (16) and (17) have an appealing
interpretation. First, notice that the drift and variance are a probability weighted average
of the mean and variance parameters for the different states. These probabilities have a
clear interpretation as inference probabilities, which are commonly used in regime switching
models (see Hamilton, 1994, eq. 22.4.5). Furthermore, Eq. (17) is a Bayesian update rule,
with ξτ+1|τ (Q˜) = Pr(Qτ+1|Fτ ) as prior probability for the prevailing regime and pi(Q˜, r, t) =
Pr(Qτ+1|rt,Fτ ) as its posterior probability. Consequently, the weight pi(Q˜, r, t) gives the
probability that state Q˜ is prevailing from τ until τ + 1, inferred from the realization of r
from τ till t ≤ τ + 1. If the probability that state Q˜ is prevailing rises, the weight with
which its parameters constitute the instantaneous drift and variance rate increases linearly
14Applications of this technique can be found in Alexander and Narayanan (2001), Alexander and Scourse
(2004) and Brigo and Mercurio (2002).
15We follow the notation in Hamilton (1994).
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with it. In the limiting case that state Q˜ is prevailing with certainty, the return at time t
will be normally distributed with parameters µQ˜(t− τ) and ΩQ˜(t− τ).
2.4 Comparing portfolios
Though the expression for the optimal portfolio Eq. (14) is the same for both the crisis
conscious and the crisis ignorant strategy, the resulting portfolios (φc and φi respectively)
will differ because of differences in µQ˜, ΩQ˜ and pi(Q˜, r, t). In this subsection we discuss
how we will determine the economic importance of the portfolio differences and how we
can explain them.
To assess the economic impact of the differences in portfolios we calculate the certainty
equivalent return needed to compensate the investor for using the crisis ignorant strategy,
when he should have used the crisis conscious one. Since the first does not take a crisis into
account, the resulting portfolio will be suboptimal and yield lower utility. The certainty
equivalent return shows by how much the initial wealth of the investor should be raised
to compensate him for this utility loss and hence the cost of ignoring a crisis. We use the
value function Eq. (11) given both portfolios16 to define the certainty equivalent return r¯:
V
(
er¯Wt, t;φ
i
)
= V (Wt, t;φ
c) . (18)
Using the functional form in Eq. (13), we find after some rearrangements that
r¯ = 1
1−γ (lnC(t;φ
c)− lnC(t;φi)), (19)
which is independent of wealth17. To identify C(t), consider the Hamiltonian Eq. (12)
at the presumed optimal solution φ∗, with derivatives based on Eq. (13). This equation
implies an ordinary differential equation for C(t):
dC = −(1− γ) [rf + φ∗′α− 12γφ∗′Ωφ∗]C(t).
This differential equation can be solved straightforwardly, yielding:
C(t;φ∗) = η exp[−(1− γ)(rf + h(φ∗))t],
with integration constant η and h(φ∗) ≡ φ∗′α − 1
2
γφ∗′Ωφ∗. Finally, we can solve for η by
using the boundary condition V (W,T ;φ∗) = U(WT ), which gives η = exp[(1 − γ)(rf +
h(φ∗))T ]. Substituting this for η produces the final result
C(t;φ∗) = exp[(1− γ)(rf + h(φ∗))(T − t)]. (20)
16We adopt the notation introduced by Das and Uppal (2004), and include the portfolio that is used to
calculate the value function as a parameter.
17This return can be interpreted as a log return, while other papers such as Ang and Bekaert (2002),
Liu et al. (2003) and Das and Uppal (2004) define the certainty equivalent return as a discrete return.
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We can combine the more general expressions Eq. (19) and Eq. (20) to find an expression
for the certainty equivalent return that is specific for the type of models in this paper18:
r¯ = [h(φc)− h(φi)](T − t). (21)
This expression is interesting in several ways. First, we observe that it only depends on
the coefficient of risk aversion γ via the function h and the portfolio φ∗. It is easy to
show that h(γ−1φ∗) = γ−1h(φ∗). Consequently, the certainty equivalent return needed to
compensate a power utility investor can be derived from the certainty equivalent return
for the log utility investor. Second, the certainty equivalent return is a linear function of
the investor’s horizon T .
The portfolio differences can stem from differences in the estimates for the basic regimes,
the estimation effect, and the absence of crisis regimes, the crisis effect. An analysis of
these differences provides insights into the importance of both sources. Suppose that the
differences in parameter estimates explain just a small part of the changes in the optimal
allocations. In that case, the crisis regime is the main driver of the portfolio adjustments.
Alternatively, if the differences in parameter estimates explain most of the changes in
optimal portfolios, the influence of the crisis itself is limited. The observations that belong
most likely to the crisis regime cause outlier problems in the crisis ignorant case.
In order to disentangle the differences between the optimal allocations produced by the
crisis conscious and ignorant strategies we introduce a myopic strategy. This strategy uses
the same estimates as the crisis conscious strategy, but excludes a crisis regime in the fore-
casts it makes. Instead of forecasts for state vectors in the complete state space ξτ+1|τ (Q˜),
only forecasts for the basic states: ξmτ+1|τ (Q) are constructed. Their mathematical relation
is:
ξmτ+1|τ (Q) = ξτ+1|τ (Q,Q
c = 0) + ξτ+1|τ (Q,Qc = 1), Q ∈ Q. (22)
The myopic strategy produces an allocation φm. We interpret the differences between
the myopic and the crisis ignorant strategy φe ≡ φm − φi as the estimation effect, and
the differences between the crisis conscious and myopic strategy as the crisis effect, φs ≡
φc − φm.
We can determine the economic importance of both effects in a similar way as we
determine the impact of the overall differences in Eq. (21). To this end we calculate h(φm),
and derive the economic importance of the estimation effect as r¯e = [h(φm)−h(φi)](T − t)
and the importance of the crisis effect as r¯s = [h(φc)− h(φm)](T − t).
3 Design of the analysis
Central in our analysis of the impact of systemic crises is a US investor who wants to
diversify his portfolio internationally. He can invest worldwide and does not only consider
18For the log utility investor we have V = ln[C(t)W ], r¯ = lnC(t;φc) − lnC(t;φi) and C(t;φ∗) =
exp[h(φ∗)(T − t)], and arrive again at Eq. (21).
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developed markets, but also emerging markets, which can extend diversification opportu-
nities19. The developed markets he considers are the US, European, Japanese and Hong
Kong market; among the emerging markets he considers Thailand, Korea and Brazil, which
are among the largest. We represent each market by an index. For each index we con-
struct a return series, on which the models for the crisis conscious and the crisis ignorant
strategies are estimated. We assume that for each country 2 regimes can be distinguished.
The estimation results are used to construct allocations. Based on the differences between
the allocations resulting from the crisis conscious strategy and the crisis ignorant strategy
we determine the impact of systemic crises. In the remainder of this section we discuss the
elements of the analysis in more detail.
We base the analysis on monthly returns, mainly because monthly data are available
with the longest history. A systemic crises is a rare event, necessitating a relatively long
history to get an accurate estimate of the probability of a systemic crisis. A longer horizon
also improves the estimate for the mean returns in the different regimes. Each developed
market is approximated by its corresponding gross return index from Morgan Stanley
Capital International (MSCI). For the emerging markets we use the gross return indexes
provided by Standard & Poors / International Finance Corporation (IFC), both provided
by DataStream. We use the start of the IFC indexes, December 31, 1975 as a starting point
for our analysis and collect the index values in dollars till December 31, 2004, resulting in
348 returns. We construct excess returns by subtracting the 1-month T-bill return from
Ibbotson Associates, Inc.20
A summary of the data is provided in Table 1. We observe the familiar picture of
small, positive means, non-zero skewness and fat tails. Generally, the minimum exceeds
the maximum in absolute value. The correlation matrix shows low levels of correlation,
particularly for the emerging markets, implying the presence of diversification possibilities.
However, Hong Kong, Thailand, Korea and Brazil may be less attractive due to their
relatively high levels of volatility.
[Table 1 about here.]
The regime switching models we propose in Section 2 belong to the standard regime
switching models as discussed in Hamilton (1994). We use the expectation maximization
algorithm (see Dempster et al., 1977; Hamilton, 1990) to estimate the parameters in the
models. Central in this algorithm is a filtering technique to determine the state probabilities
at each point in time. If the improvement in the likelihood function falls below a specified
limit, the algorithm stops. To ensure that the estimate covariance matrix is positive
definite, we assume that the correlation matrix is independent of the basic state vectors.
The expression for the optimal portfolio in Eq. (14) defines an asset allocation strategy
in continuous time. This means that we can derive the evolution of portfolios over time for
19Early studies (see e.g. Harvey, 1995) find significant diversification opportunities, but more recent
studies show these may be less when transaction costs and investment constraints are taken into account
(see Bekaert and Harvey, 2003, for a discussion).
20We use the series available on the website of Kenneth French,
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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a given price path. We construct paths of portfolios based on daily prices. The data we
use are the daily prices of the mentioned gross return indexes in dollar terms, also gathered
from DataStream. To keep the daily and monthly data sets consistent, we use the 1-month
T-bill rate that was prevailing at the beginning of the month to compute the daily excess
returns.
The portfolio at a given day of the month reflects two sources of information: a prior
probability based on the information at the beginning of the month, and the information
present in the returns observed until that day. The second source of information is used
to update the prior probability to a posterior probability as in Eq. (17). We interpret the
prior probability as the outcome of an investor’s thorough analysis of the likelihood of a
state. Because of its thoroughness such an analysis is conducted at a limited frequency, i.e.
once per month. We represent the outcomes of the analysis by a Markov chain. The prior
probability can be regarded as an informative prior, because it is based on all available
information at the moment it is determined. We will also consider the allocation that
results if the investor does not use the observed stock price path to determine the prior
probabilities. Instead, the investor uses unconditional probabilities for each regime, which
are only based on the transition matrices. The results from this analysis can serve as a
benchmark and can be compared to the results in Das and Uppal (2004).
4 Estimation results
In this section we present and discuss the results from estimating the models for the returns
in the two strategies. We split the discussion in two: first we consider the estimates for
the distributions under the different regimes; next we turn to the parameter estimates for
the transition probabilities of the Markov chains.
Table 2 presents the estimates for the parameters of the marginal normal distributions.
The main difference between the crisis ignorant and crisis conscious strategy is the presence
of the crisis regime in the latter one. The crisis regime contains a shock with an estimated
mean of -0.63% and a volatility of 1.54. The shock has been normalized such that the US
has a sensitivity of 1. The other countries (except Europe) are more sensitive to the shock,
in particular the emerging countries Korea and Thailand which are more than 10 times as
sensitive as the US. The considerable difference in log likelihood valuess21 of 19.0, provides
evidence in favor of the addition of a crisis regime. However standard statistical tests
cannot be used, because several parameters are not identified under the null hypothesis.22
[Table 2 about here.]
21The log likelihood values for the models without and with a crisis equal -8029.5 and -8010.5, respec-
tively.
22Hansen (1992) proposes a method to formally test whether the addition of a regime is a significant
improvement. In this method, the likelihood function is maximized over different combinations of fixed
values for the restricted and nuisance parameters. The number of combinations grows exponentially in the
number of parameters, which makes the method less attractive to test the significance of the crisis regime.
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We observe that for both models, the two basic regimes for each asset can be distin-
guished by their volatility levels. This finding has been previously reported by Ramchand
and Susmel (1998), Ang and Bekaert (2002) and Graflund and Nilsson (2003). In the
remainder we will therefore use the terms low volatility regime and high volatility regime
to distinguish between the regimes.
Based on the estimates for the shock and the basic high volatility regimes, we can derive
the means and volatilities in the crisis regime. As expected, the crisis regime exhibits a
sharp drop in expected returns and an increase in volatilities. Because of their large
sensitivity to a crisis, these effects are most pronounced for emerging markets, which may
also offer an explanation for the fat tails reported by Susmel (2001). Table 3 shows that
the correlations in the crisis regime are also higher, as has been reported before by Ang and
Chen (2002) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002). It is obvious that the risk-return trade-off for
each asset deteriorates, while the correlation matrix shows that diversification possibilities
also become less. Consequently, risky assets become less attractive on a global scale.
However, the correlation between the emerging markets on the one hand and the US and
Europe on the other hand remain low. The exact consequences become clear in the next
section.
The addition of a crisis regime has important effects on the other estimates as well. The
risk within each regime becomes less, as most volatility estimates decrease, particularly
those in the high volatility regime. Moreover, the means in the high volatility regimes
increase considerably, indicating that the few crisis observations differ substantially from
normal high volatility periods.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 4 presents the estimates for the parameters of the logistic functions that we use to
construct the regime transition probabilities (see the Appendix for more details). In total,
we have 2·72 = 98 parameters from which we construct the 128×128 (= 27) basic transition
matrix. The diagonal elements give the estimates that correspond with no regime switch
for a country, given that the other countries are currently in their low volatility regimes.
The off-diagonal elements give the volatility spill-over estimates, which are restricted to
be negative (positive) for switches from the low (high) volatility regimes. Because of
these restrictions, volatility spill-over effects increase the probability that countries are
in their high volatility regimes. As an example, consider the Hong Kong market. The
probability that the Hong Kong market remains in its low volatility regime, given that
the other markets are also in their low volatility regimes equals e3.75/(1 + e3.75) = 0.98.
However, we find volatility spill-over from the US to Hong Kong: if the US is in its high
volatility remain, the probability that Hong Kong switches from low to high volatility is
e3.75−0.48/(1 + e3.75−0.48) = 0.96.
[Table 4 about here.]
We draw several conclusions from the estimates in Table 4. First of all, each regimes is
in itself strongly persistent, as indicated by high values for the positive diagonal elements
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(exceptions are the high volatility regimes for Japan and Korea). Second, volatility spill-
over effects mainly affect the probability of a switch from the low volatility to the high
volatility regimes; the probability that a country remains in its high volatility regime,
given that other countries are also in their high volatility regimes, is less affected. Third,
volatility spill-over effects are mainly present among the developed markets, and from
emerging markets to developed markets. Other studies finds volatility spill-over effects from
the US and Japan to other Asian markets, such as Hong Kong, Thailand and Korea (see
Bekaert and Harvey, 1997; Ng, 2000; Lee et al., 2004), but this may be due to differences in
the applied methods (GARCH-models versus regime switching models; daily vs. monthly
data).
Finally, we consider the probability estimates for a systemic crisis. A crisis has a
probability of 0.0031 to occur, given that currently no crisis occurs. However, if a crisis
occurs, it is highly persistent, as indicated by the probability of 0.93 of remaining in the
crisis regime. Unconditionally, if no prior information on the prevailing regimes is available,
the crisis regime occurs with a probability of 0.045. Das and Uppal (2004) estimate a
probability on a systemic jump of 0.0501 for the developed markets and of 0.0138 for the
US with emerging markets, which is comparable to the unconditional probability we find.
However, in their model, a systemic jump at this instant does not affect the probability of
a jump in the next instant, which remains relatively low as a consequence. This illustrates
the main difference between their model and the model we propose.
5 Portfolio construction
Based on the estimates of the previous section we construct optimal portfolios for the
crisis conscious and crisis ignorant strategies. The portfolios vary over time and depend
on the filtration of the return processes, limiting the relevancy of an analysis of static
portfolios. Instead, we concentrate on two situations. First, we consider the influence of a
crisis when the investor uses uninformative forecast probabilities for the likelihood of the
different regimes, or in other words has no prior knowledge on the state of the economy.
In the second situation we analyze the effects of a crisis when the investor uses informative
forecasts in a period in which the probability that a crisis was actually prevailing was
high, being the second half of 1997, when the Asian crisis took place. We concentrate on
October 1997, the month in which the Hong Kong market crashed. The second situation
is the more interesting one, since we can observe how both strategies perform in a real-life
situation. The first situation will be useful as a benchmark and enables a comparison with
the results of Das and Uppal (2004) and Liu et al. (2003).
For both cases we conduct an analysis consisting of the same steps. We present and
motivate the steps here, together with their main outcomes. We start by deriving and
comparing the optimal allocations for the log utility investor. Though the assumption of
log utility is unrealistic due to its low degree of risk aversion, the log utility portfolio is
popular in asset allocation studies. The optimal portfolio for a power utility investor is the
log utility portfolio scaled by the inverse of his coefficient of relative risk aversion and an
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investment in the riskless asset to meet the budget constraint. The considerable differences
between the crisis conscious and crisis ignorant strategies that we find indicate that the
crisis conscious strategy invests less in risky assets. An inspection of only the risky part
shows that the crisis conscious strategy shifts investment to countries less prone to a crisis.
Next, we determine the economic importance of the differences between the two strate-
gies. We calculate the certainty equivalent return that the investor requires as a com-
pensation for adopting the crisis ignorant strategy, when the crisis conscious strategy is
appropriate. For the uninformative case, the costs of ignoring the possibility of a systemic
crisis are limited, but large enough not to neglect them, particularly for longer horizons.
In the second situation, when a crisis takes place with almost certainty, the certainty
equivalent return rises substantially, also for more risk averse investors.
We conclude the analysis by investigating what can explain the differences between the
crisis conscious and crisis ignorant portfolios: the differences in the parameters estimates
for the basic component, or the hedging demand due to the possibility of a crisis. To
accomplish this we use the myopic strategy introduced in Section 2.4. This strategy uses
the same estimates for the basic part as the crisis conscious model, but excludes the crisis
regime from the forecasts it makes. Consequently, the differences between the portfolios
produced by the crisis ignorant and the myopic strategies are due to different parameter
estimates for the basic component. On the other hand, the differences between the myopic
strategy and the crisis conscious strategy stem solely from the crisis regime. These latter
differences have the clear interpretation of a hedging demand. We find that the investor
hedges against a crisis by taking a long position in the US, Europe, and the riskless asset
and a short position in the stock markets of the other countries.
In the next two subsections we report the actual analysis in more detail. In the last
subsection we discuss some robustness checks.
5.1 Static analysis
In Table 5 we present the portfolios that a log utility investor would construct, if he has no
information on the price path of the assets so far. Most importantly, the crisis conscious
strategy results in a less aggressive allocation than the crisis ignorant strategy. Overall,
the position is less leveraged: the investor lends 3.79 times his initial wealth opposed to
4.71 under the crisis ignorant strategy. Das and Uppal (2004) report similar, though less
pronounced results. Leverage is large because we report the log utility portfolio. An
investor with coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5 would invest 4% in the risk
free asset, adopting the crisis conscious, or lend 14% of his wealth, if he adopts the crisis
ignorant strategy. The risky asset portfolio itself does not change much.
[Table 5 about here.]
It is costly to ignore the possibility of a crisis. A log-utility investor who incorrectly
adopts the crisis ignorant strategy requires a certainty equivalent return of 0.09% per
month (or 1.13% per year) as compensation. For more risk averse investors, the required
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compensation becomes less, as the certainty equivalent return should be divided by their
coefficient of relative risk aversion. A comparison of this result with findings of Das and
Uppal (2004) highlights the importance of persistence. Das and Uppal (2004) report that
an investor with coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3 and a horizon of 1 year requires a
return of 0.1% as compensation for incorrectly ignoring the systemic jumps in their model.
A similar investor in our approach would require a return of 0.38% for incorrectly following
the crisis ignorant strategy. Since both systemic events have a comparable probability of
occurrence, we conclude that persistence increases the importance of systemic crises. Das
and Uppal also show that the certainty equivalent return is an increasing and convex
function of the probability of a systemic crisis (see Das and Uppal, 2003, Section 5.2.5,
Appendix A.2 and Figure 4), but the degree of persistence they consider is fairly low.
Overall, the decomposition of the differences shows that the estimation effect causes a
more prudent allocation: leverage is decreased by 0.40. However, within the risky asset
part of the portfolio, investments shift from the US and Europe to Asia. A comparison
of the estimates for the high volatility regimes in the crisis conscious model with those in
the crisis ignorant model, shows that particularly the high volatility regimes for the Asian
markets become more attractive. Of course, this implies that the crisis regimes entails
substantial risk for investments in Asian equity. The crisis effect cause large divestments
in Asia, which are partly directed towards the US and European markets and partly to
the riskless asset. In the uninformative case, the estimation effect and crisis effect cancel
out more or less for the Asian markets, but for the developed market the estimation effect
dominates. Also in an economic sense the crisis effect is the more important. A log-utility
investor requires a compensation of 0.31% per month for ignoring the crisis effect. If he
also ignores the estimation effect, the required compensation reduces to 0.1% per month.
Overall, we conclude that the implications of the possibility of a systemic crises are
already visible in an uninformative, static setting. Including a crisis regime in the model
for asset returns leads to improved estimates for the basic regime, and boosts investments
in emerging markets, but the probability of large negative returns curbs it. Though the
estimation effect dominates, the combined effects shift investments to the riskless asset,
indicating that incorporating a crisis leads to prudence. Ignoring this prudence can cost
up to 1.13% per year.
5.2 October 1997: the Asian crisis
After studying the effects of a systemic crisis when no prior information is used, we now
turn to an informative setting. We investigate the implications of the strategies for asset al-
location in October 1997, the month during which the Hong Kong market crashed. We take
the estimates presented in the previous sections as given. The inference probabilities that
the investor uses are constructed by applying the filtering technique described in Hamilton
(1994) on the data set up to September 1997. This setup enables us to observe how the
dive of the Hong Kong market influenced the inference probabilities and consequently the
asset allocation. The calculation of certainty equivalent returns and decompositions can
help us to understand the changes in optimal asset allocations over time, caused by the
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continuous updating of the inference probabilities.
The Asian crisis hit financial markets during the second half of 1997.23 In August 1997
the Thai market crashed. Only after the crash of the Hong Kong market, the shocks in Asia
were considered as a global crisis. An inspection of the inference probabilities of our model
produces a similar picture. By the end of August and September the inferred probability
for the crisis regime did not exceed 0.05, but by the end of October it had risen to almost
1. The smoothed inference probabilities resulting from our model confirm the view that
the sharp drop in the Thai market could be seen as an overture to the Asian crisis. After
August and September, the smoothed inference probability of the crisis regime was above
0.80, and from October onwards it remained close to 1.
Figure 1(a) plots the cumulative excess returns for the different countries. The cumula-
tive returns in the Asian markets are already negative during the beginning of the month,
but the US, Europe and Brazil realize small, positive returns. However, after October 17,
1997 (the 13th trading day of that month) the Hong Kong market starts to dive: from
-9.5% to -50% in 7 days. The Thai and Korean market move in lock step, but the other
markets also suffer large price drops, in particular the Brazilian market. At the end of
October 20, a Monday, the inference probability for the crisis regime in the crisis conscious
model climbs to 0.71 and remains high for the rest of the month. So the conscious strategy
deems the crisis regime the most likely one for the second half of the month.
[Figure 1 about here.]
To see what the investor would infer had he not taken a crisis into account, we plot
the inferences for the crisis ignorant model in Figure 1(c). In the first half of the month,
it is inferred that the US and the Thai market, probably accompanied by the Hong Kong
market, are in their high volatility regimes. After the sharp decline in the Hong Kong
market it is inferred that in all markets the high volatility regime is prevailing, though
some doubt exist regarding Japan and Brazil.
The allocations to which the crisis conscious and crisis ignorant strategies lead during
the month are plotted in Figure 2. Adopting the crisis conscious strategy leads to less risky
allocations. First of all, when applying the crisis conscious strategy, an investor uses less
leverage as can be concluded from Figure 2(h). Both strategies start with approximately the
same degree of leverage, but as October goes by and the probability of a crisis increases,
leverage decreases faster in the crisis conscious strategy. By the end of the month the
crisis conscious strategy has a long position in the risk free asset, while the crisis ignorant
portfolio is still leveraged. It is particularly interesting to see that following the crisis
conscious strategy leads to a sharp decrease in leverage already before the dive of the Hong
Kong market.
[Figure 2 about here.]
23See Kamin (1999) for a broad discussion of the symptoms of the Asian crisis. Kaminsky and Schmukler
(1999) investigate the causes of daily market fluctuations during the Asian crisis.
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[Figure 3 about here.]
In the crisis conscious strategy, foreign markets quickly become less attractive as the
probability of a crisis rises. For four of them (Japan, Hong-Kong, Thailand and Korea), the
conscious strategy even advises short positions. When applying the crisis ignorant strategy,
the investor decreases his exposure to some of these markets (Japan, Hong Kong), but he
increases his exposure to Hong Kong and Korea by the end of the month and maintains
long positions in these markets throughout most of the month. Again it is reassuring to see
that the investor adopting the crisis conscious strategy withdraws quickly from the Hong
Kong market, when the probability of a crisis rises. When adopting the crisis ignorant
strategy, the Hong Kong market remains much longer attractive.
Based on this analysis, we conclude that the differences between the two strategies as
revealed in Figure 2 are pronounced. Though interesting on themselves, the evolution of the
certainty equivalent return presented in Figure 3 clearly demonstrates that the economic
importance of these differences is also very substantial. For the complete month, so also
before the dive of the Hong Kong market, the certainty equivalent return well exceeds the
0.09% per month that we found in the uninformative case, as it remains above 0.3% per
month on each day. Moreover, it rises dramatically (to at most 4.0%) after the crash of
the Hong Kong market. Of course, these returns are lower for more risk averse investors,
but we stress that these percentages correspond with a 1-month horizon.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The results also indicate that diversification opportunities deteriorate rapidly if the
inference probability of a crisis increases. Already before the crisis hits, leverage decreases,
investments are reduced and in some countries short position are taken. These findings
can be seen as an addition to the results in Ang and Bekaert (2002), who conclude that
diversification opportunities do not disappear when the bearish regime in their model is
prevailing. Since the crisis regime in our model consists of the bear regime of each country
and a shock (with a negative mean) on top of that, conditions are much worse in the crisis
regime, and consequently we do observe such a deterioration.
We conclude the analysis by considering the estimation and crisis effects over October
1997, which are also plotted in Figure 2. From the crisis effect we conclude that also
during a crisis, the US and European market and the riskless asset can be used to hedge
against a crisis at the expense of investments in the other countries. We observe a positive
demand for the US and European asset, and a strong and increasing positive demand for
the riskless asset. Positions in other markets are more and more reduced, particularly in the
emerging markets Korea and Thailand, which are most prone to a crisis. The estimation
effect presents a less clear picture. In the uninformative case, the estimation effect causes
investments to shift from the riskless asset to the risky assets. Now we observe a preference
for Japan, Korea and Thailand. Within the risky asset part we observe a tendency to more
aggressive allocations, but leverage is not increased much. The certainty equivalent returns
associated with missing the crisis effect are also considerable, being always positive and
19
rising rapidly. Of course, missing the crisis effect becomes extremely expensive after a crisis
has occurred (with a maximum at 10%). The estimation effect does not always harm the
investor’s utility. Finally, the estimation effect influences utility less (in absolute sense)
than the crisis effect.
The portfolio differences and the corresponding certainty equivalent returns lead to
several important conclusions. First, the differences and their importance become rapidly
larger when the inference probability of a crisis increases. Second, an inference probability
of a crisis of around 0.10 already leads to portfolio differences that are much larger than
in the uninformative case (in that case the probability of a crisis equals 0.05) and much
more costly to ignore. Third, an investor that adopts the crisis conscious strategy takes
precautions well before the inference probability reaches high levels (exceeding 0.5). Finally,
the occurrence of a crisis rapidly diminishes diversification opportunities.
5.3 Robustness checks
In order to gauge the strength of our results, we subject them to several robustness checks.
We start by repeating our analysis of the allocations during October 1997 for four different
months during the Asian crisis: August, September, November and December. We continue
by investigating the effects of short selling constraints on the different allocations. Next, we
determine the portfolio turnover for the different strategies and use it to discuss the possible
impact of transaction costs. In each following subsection, we discuss each robustness check
briefly24.
5.3.1 Other months during the Asian crisis
The Asian crisis was perceived as a global crisis after the collapse of the Hong Kong
market and the following by other markets in October 1997. The crisis actually built up
during August and September, but it was not perceived as a systemic crisis then. After
October, the crisis was perceived to take place with almost certainty. This makes August,
September, November and December interesting months to study as well.
In August the Thai market crashed, but it was not followed by other markets as much as
the Hong Kong crash in October. In September the Thai market showed sharp fluctuations
and the Korean market decreased considerably (at most -14%). In November all Asian
markets declined steadily. December showed again large declines for the emerging markets
(in particular Korea and Thailand), though the other markets seemed to stabilize. Inference
probabilities for a systemic crisis are low in August and September and high in November
and December.
We perform the analysis discussed in section 5.2 for these months and find large similar-
ities, which supports our conclusions based on October. In all months the crisis conscious
strategy advises a smaller exposure to emerging markets. In August and September, it
advises a higher exposure to the developed markets while in November and December,
24The complete results are available from the authors.
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leverage is decreased. Because the inference probability for a crisis is large throughout
November and December, the certainty equivalent return to compensate for the crisis ig-
norant strategy is also large in those months (well above 5.0% for a log-utility investor
with a 1 month horizon). In August and September, the inference probability for a crisis is
low, but we still observe certainty equivalent returns that exceed the 0.09% that resulted
from the uninformative case.
5.3.2 Short sales constraints
Large short positions as in Figure 2 may not be feasible. Therefore, we construct optimal
allocations for both strategies for an investor facing short sales constraints. In the appendix
we derive the optimal portfolio under the restriction that the portfolio weights for the risky
assets are nonnegative.25 We use that result to determine the optimal allocation for both
the uninformative case and the informative case of October 1997.
In the uninformative case, the consequences of short sales constraints are limited. Both
strategies do not invest in Japan. The investments in the other countries are slightly
reduced, but we mainly observe an increase in leverage of both portfolios. Because the
portfolio adjustments are similar for both strategies, the decomposition in the estimation
and the crisis effect, and the certainty equivalent return needed to compensate for the crisis
ignorant strategy remain largely unaffected.
The analysis of October 1997 yields more interesting insights. First of all, the investor
who uses the crisis conscious strategy leaves all markets, if a crisis occurs. In the appendix,
we show that assets for which α ≡ µi + 12ωi − rf is negative and the covariance with other
assets is positive are not invested in. Based on the parameters reported in Tables 2 and
3 we conclude these conditions are satisfied. During October 1997, a crisis does not occur
with certainty, but its inferred probability is large enough.
Figure 4 shows the allocations for the trading days in October 1997. Imposing short
sales constraints results in less volatile and less aggressive allocations for both strategies.
The conscious strategy stays out of the Japanese, Hong Kong and Korean market during
the complete month; the allocations to the Thai and Brazilian market are reduced quickly.
During the last days of the month, the crisis conscious strategy advises to leave all markets,
while the crisis ignorant strategy advises to leave only Japan and Thailand. Despite their
high volatility, the other markets remain attractive. Because the differences between the
allocations become smaller in absolute sense, the certainty equivalent return decreases
slightly. The other months (August till December) confirm these findings. In August and
September, the crisis conscious strategy advises neither to invest in the Korean market.
We conclude that the impact of short sales constraints on allocations can be large,
particularly for high probabilities of a systemic crises. However, also if short sales con-
straints are imposed it remains economically important to take the possibility of a crisis
into account.
25For a more general treatment of optimal portfolio selection for investors with CRRA utility facing
short sales constraints, see Tepla´ (2000).
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[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
5.3.3 Portfolio turnover
In this subsection we shortly discuss the portfolio turnover that results from the different
strategies. We use this information to gauge the possible impact of transaction costs on our
results. Though transaction costs are present in the real world and can seriously impact
dynamic trading strategies (see e.g. Liu and Loewenstein, 2002; Balduzzi and Lynch, 1999),
including transaction costs in the asset allocation problem would impede our analysis and is
not our chief interest. Instead, we turn attention to the portfolio turnover of the different
strategies as a measure of their variability. Higher variability typically leads to higher
transaction costs. If the crisis conscious strategy leads to a higher portfolio turnover than
the crisis ignorant strategy, introducing transaction costs will affect the crisis conscious
allocations most.
We calculate the portfolio turnover by summing the absolute changes in the portfo-
lio weights for the risky assets. Transactions costs will be a fraction of this measure, if
transaction costs are proportional to the value of assets bought or sold. For the log utility
investor, we find that the turnover in October 1997 equals 123.5 for the crisis conscious
strategy versus 97.6 for the crisis ignorant strategy, 1.25 times as much, indicating that the
crisis ignorant strategy is more stable. The turnover is large, but this is partly due to the
assumption of log utility. In order to move to power utility, the log utility turnover should
be divided by the coefficient of relative risk aversion. For the other months we calculate
lower numbers, as the large drops during October lead to large adjustments of the portfolio
weights. We interpret relatively small differences in turnover as evidence that our results
are robust to transaction costs.
6 Conclusions
A systemic crisis in international equity markets can put investors in dire straits, because
of the simultaneous decrease in expected returns and increase in volatilities and corre-
lations. However, standard models supporting asset allocation decisions typically fail to
fully capture systemic crises due to their irregular and relatively rare occurrences. In this
paper, we have proposed a framework to determine the impact of systemic crises on asset
allocations, which combines regime switching models with optimal portfolio construction
in continuous time. In this framework, an investor can adopt a crisis conscious strategy
that includes systemic crises, and, as an alternative, a crisis ignorant strategy which ex-
cludes it. We have studied the allocations of a US-based, global investor, who maximizes
his expected utility by investing in equity markets in the US, Europe, Japan, Hong Kong,
Thailand, Korea and Brazil, and a riskless asset. We have considered the case in which
he has no information on the likelihood of the different states in the regime switching
model, and the informative case of October 1997, which belongs to the Asian crisis. If the
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investor adopts the crisis conscious strategy, he shifts investments to countries that are
less prone to a crisis, and tends to decrease the proportion of his wealth invested in risky
assets. The calculation of certainty equivalent returns indicates that these differences are
economically important. The investor requires a substantial compensation for incorrectly
adopting the crisis ignorant strategy in the uninformative case, and this compensation rises
quickly during October 1997.
The pronounced portfolio differences and their economic importance indicate that per-
sistence is an important characteristic of systemic crises. We have estimated that the
probability of remaining in the crisis regime for another month equals 0.90. Because of
this persistence, we find stronger evidence advocating the incorporation of systemic crises
in asset allocation decisions than reported by Das and Uppal (2004, 2003), while the cor-
responding unconditional probabilities on a crisis are similar (0.045 versus 0.0501). Crisis
persistence also explains the large differences between the crisis conscious and ignorant
strategies and the large required compensation if a crisis occurs with almost certainty.
This would also explain the well-known fact that investors stay away from financial mar-
kets after a systemic crises for a relatively long period of time.
We also find that systemic crises seriously diminish diversification possibilities. If a
crisis has a small probability of occurrence, this effect is present but limited. As the proba-
bility increases, the impact becomes larger and leads to short positions in several markets.
When the investors faces short sales constraints, he withdraws from equity markets com-
pletely. These findings are complementary to Ang and Bekaert (2002) who conclude that
the presence of a bear regime in a regime switching model does not extinguish diversifi-
cation possibilities. However, because of its severity the crisis regime in our model causes
a much stronger deterioration in the risk-return trade-off than the bear regime in their
model.
This paper can motivate further research in several ways. Some parts of our model
are kept at a basic level for clarity. It would be interesting, however, to see the influence
of a crisis when other economic variables are used to predict the likelihood of a crisis or
the corresponding means and variances. A more normative model for a crisis can also
be interesting. Our finding that crisis conscious strategies shift allocations from countries
that are relatively prone to a crisis to countries that are less prone to it can add to the
research on the home bias puzzle (see Lewis, 1999, for an overview), particularly in relation
to emerging markets. These are issues for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 A multinomial model for regime transition probabilities
In this appendix we discuss the specification of the multinomial logistic model that we
propose for the regime transition probabilities in Section 2.1 in more detail. The probability
piabi gives the marginal probability that asset i will switch to regime Q
a
i , given that the
current regime is Q˜b, and that a crisis is absent in both the current and the destination
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regime, and has functional form:
piabi =
exp f(Qai , Q
b)
1 +
∑K−1
k=1 exp f(Q
a
i = k,Q
b)
(23)
The summation in the denominator excludes the Kth basic regime to ensure that the
probabilities add up to 1. We specify the function f(Qai , Q
b) as follows:
f(Qai = k,Q
b) = ψi,k,Qbi +
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
K∑
k′=2
ψi,j,k,k′I(Q
b
j = k
′), (24)
where ψi,k,Qbi and ψi,j,k,k′ are constant, and I() denotes the indicator function that returns
one if the statement in parentheses evaluates to true and zero otherwise. If all assets other
than asset i are in their low volatility regimes (Qbj = 1), the function returns the constant
ψi,k,Qbj . For the assets that are in a higher volatility level k
′, constants ψi,j,k′ are added
to it. We require ψi,j,k,k′ < 0 for k < k
′, ψi,j,k,k′ > 0 for k ≥ k′, and ψi,j,k,k′ < ψi,j,k,k′′
for k′ < k′′ to ensure that the volatility spill-over effects increase the probability of higher
volatility regimes.
A.2 Short sales constraints
Short sales constraints can be included in the asset allocation problem straightforwardly.
The basic optimization problem, constituted by constituted by Eq. (7) and Eq. (10) is now
extended with short sales constraints φi,t ≥ 0, ∀t, i = 1, . . . , n. The new first order
conditions for optimality include Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the new restrictions. To
derive these we start with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (13), combined with the
guess for the indirect utility function (14):
max
φ
(
∂C(t)
∂t
W 1−γ
1− γ + (rf + φ
′α)W 1−γ − 1
2
γφ′ΩφW 1−γ
)
= 0, (25)
where α ≡ µ + 1
2
diag(Ω) − rf ιn. We introduce Lagrange multipliers λi,t ≥ 0 ∀t for the
short sales constraint on asset i and construct a Lagrangian function by adding the term
φ′λ to the maximand in the HJB-equation. Differentiation yields the following first order
conditions:
α− γΩφ = −λW−(1−γ) (26)
φiλi = 0 (27)
φi, λi ≥ 0, (28)
where the last two restrictions are the complementary slackness conditions.
This system of (in)equalities resembles the system of (in)equalities resulting from a
mean-variance portfolio optimization problem with short sales constraints (see Tepla´, 2000;
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de Roon et al., 2001). Consequently, the optimal portfolio can also be characterized sim-
ilarly. Let Ip be the set of indices for which the short selling constraints are not binding,
and use the superscript p to denote the subvectors and submatrices with respect to that
set. The optimal positive weights are given by:
φp = γ−1(Ωp)−1αp. (29)
The Lagrange multipliers for the assets in the complement I◦ of Ip can be found as:
λ◦ = (−α◦ + γΩ◦pφp)W 1−γ = (−α◦ + Ω◦p(Ωp)−1αp)W 1−γ ≥ 0 (30)
where Ω◦p denotes the n◦ × np covariance matrix of the returns of the assets in I◦ with
those in Ip. Using positivity of wealth, a partition of the assets into subsets Ip and I◦ is
valid if and only if −α◦+Ω◦p(Ωp)−1αp ≥ 0. In general, the validity of a partition will have
to be checked using this condition. However, it easy is to verify that assets i for which
αi ≤ 0 and Ωij ≥ 0 ∀j will always be in I◦.
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(a) univariate statistics
US Europe Japan Hong Kong Thailand Korea Brazil
mean 0.50 0.53 0.31 0.69 0.31 0.41 0.32
volatility 4.38 4.75 6.48 9.31 10.22 10.54 15.42
skewness -0.76 -0.72 0.07 -1.08 -0.44 0.36 -0.49
kurtosis 5.98 4.78 3.48 8.43 6.01 5.81 6.01
minimum -24.45 -21.65 -22.18 -57.58 -41.88 -41.37 -84.79
maximum 12.05 12.69 21.04 28.37 38.14 53.17 44.84
(b) correlation matrix
US Europe Japan Hong Kong Thailand Korea Brazil
US 1 0.64 0.30 0.42 0.32 0.28 0.21
Europe 0.64 1 0.48 0.50 0.31 0.25 0.25
Japan 0.30 0.48 1 0.30 0.25 0.37 0.15
Hong Kong 0.42 0.50 0.30 1 0.39 0.21 0.21
Thailand 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.39 1 0.39 0.13
Korea 0.28 0.25 0.37 0.21 0.39 1 0.12
Brazil 0.21 0.25 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.12 1
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the data set consisting of the monthly excess gross returns
(in %) for the MSCI US, MSCI Europe, MSCI Japan, MSCI Hong Kong, IFC Thailand, IFC
Korea and IFC Brazil indexes, running from January 1976 to December 2004. Panel (a) presents
univariate statistics, panel (b) shows the correlation matrix.
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crisis ignorant crisis conscious
low high low high crisis
US µ 0.90 0.35 0.95 0.47 -0.16√
ω 2.47 4.99 2.21 4.73 4.97
1.00
EU µ 1.10 0.23 1.17 0.26 -0.30√
ω 3.09 5.46 3.07 5.35 5.52
0.88
Japan µ 0.44 0.03 0.20 0.74 -1.46√
ω 5.14 8.29 4.92 8.26 9.83
3.47
Hong Kong µ 0.93 0.57 0.92 0.74 -2.15√
ω 6.00 13.34 5.77 12.98 14.75
4.55
Thailand µ 0.80 -0.53 -0.22 1.51 -7.03√
ω 6.29 15.28 5.24 11.44 23.62
13.46
Korea µ 0.34 1.28 0.19 1.94 -6.55√
ω 7.26 15.69 6.56 12.44 24.04
13.40
Brazil µ 0.96 -0.73 0.86 -0.01 -2.43√
ω 9.83 20.91 8.49 19.49 20.35
3.81
µc -0.63√
ωc 1.54
Table 2: Parameter estimates. This tables reports the estimates for the mean parameters (µ)
and volatility parameters (
√
ω) of the marginal distributions of the excess monthly equity return
(in %) for the US, Europe Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand Korea and Brazil under the low and high
volatility regimes. The first two columns present the estimates for the crisis ignorant strategy;
the second two for the crisis conscious strategy. The parameters for the crisis conscious strategy
also contain estimates for the shock: a mean (µc) and variance (
√
ωc). The last column contains
the estimates for the sensitivity to a systemic crisis (δ) and the resulting mean and volatility.
The sensitivity of the US market has been normalized to 1.
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(a) crisis ignorant
US EU JP HK TH KO BR
US 1 0.65 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.27 0.23
EU 0.65 1 0.48 0.53 0.30 0.27 0.27
JP 0.29 0.48 1 0.32 0.18 0.38 0.15
HK 0.46 0.53 0.32 1 0.35 0.22 0.25
TH 0.28 0.30 0.18 0.35 1 0.24 0.11
KO 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.22 0.24 1 0.13
BR 0.23 0.27 0.15 0.25 0.11 0.13 1
(b) crisis conscious
US EU JP HK TH KO BR
US 1 0.64 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.26 0.24
EU 0.64 1 0.49 0.54 0.32 0.26 0.27
JP 0.30 0.49 1 0.32 0.15 0.35 0.16
HK 0.47 0.54 0.32 1 0.37 0.21 0.26
TH 0.33 0.32 0.15 0.37 1 0.21 0.10
KO 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.21 0.21 1 0.14
BR 0.24 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.14 1
(c) crisis regime
US EU JP HK TH KO BR
US 1 0.67 0.41 0.54 0.42 0.39 0.31
EU 0.67 1 0.53 0.57 0.37 0.34 0.32
JP 0.41 0.53 1 0.49 0.53 0.62 0.28
HK 0.54 0.57 0.49 1 0.57 0.50 0.36
TH 0.42 0.37 0.53 0.57 1 0.80 0.30
KO 0.39 0.34 0.62 0.50 0.80 1 0.32
BR 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.30 0.32 1
Table 3: Estimates for the correlations between the different countries for the crisis ignorant
(panel a) and crisis conscious strategy (panel b) and the resulting correlations for the crisis
regime (panel c). The correlations are assumed to be independent of the basic regimes.
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log utility portfolio risky assets portfolio
crisis crisis crisis crisis
ignorant conscious φe φs ignorant conscious φe φs
US 1.61 1.15 -0.68 0.22 0.28 0.24 -0.11 0.06
Europe 3.59 2.98 -1.06 0.44 0.63 0.62 -0.15 0.14
Japan -0.70 -0.39 0.45 -0.13 -0.12 -0.08 0.07 -0.03
Hong Kong 0.26 0.27 0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.01
Thailand 0.02 0.07 0.55 -0.50 0.00 0.01 0.10 -0.09
Korea 0.60 0.44 0.30 -0.46 0.11 0.09 0.06 -0.08
Brazil 0.33 0.27 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00
risk free -4.71 -3.79 0.40 0.52 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Optimal portfolios for the crisis ignorant and crisis conscious strategies for different
situations: log utility and an investment in risky assets only. The portfolios are the initial
portfolios (t = 0) based on the unconditional inference probabilities. The portfolio weights for
the different countries and the risk-free asset are reported in the first two columns. The differences
between the allocations are decomposed in an estimation effect φe and a crisis effect φs.
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Figure 1: The return path (excess returns, in %) of the indexes for the US, Europe (EU), Japan
(JP), Hong Kong (HK), Thailand (TH), Korea (KO) and Brazil (BR) (panel a) and the resulting
inferences for the crisis conscious strategy (panel b) and the crisis ignorant strategy (panel c)
for each trading day in October 1997 (numbered consecutively). The inference probabilities
are constructed by updating the forecast probabilities based on the returns to September 1997
in a Bayesian fashion as given in Eq. (17). We only plot the inferences for a state vector, if
the inferences have exceeded 0.4 at least once: for the crisis conscious strategy that is US and
Thailand high volatility, others low (dashed line), US, Hong Kong and Thailand high volatility,
others low (long dashed line), and the crisis state (solid line); for the crisis ignorant strategy
that is US and Thailand high volatility, others low (dashed line), US, Hong Kong and Thailand
high volatility, others low (long dashed line), US, Europe, Hong Kong, Thailand and Korea high
volatility, others low (solid line) and the state in which all countries have high volatility (dotted
line).
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Figure 2: The proportion invested in the different countries for the crisis conscious and crisis
ignorant strategy and a decomposition of the differences for each trading day in October 1997
(numbered consecutively). We assume the investor has a log utility function. The portfolios are
based on the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 and the inference probabilities that are constructed by
updating the forecast probabilities based on the returns to September 1997 in a Bayesian fashion
as given in Eq. (17). The portfolio differences between the two portfolios are decomposed in an
estimation and a crisis effect .
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Figure 3: Certainty equivalent return (in %) needed to compensate the investor for adopting
the suboptimal ignorant strategy and a decomposition in an estimation and crisis effect for each
trading day in October 1997 (numbered consecutively). We assume the investor has a log utility
function and a horizon of 1 month. The portfolios during October 1997 and the corresponding
decompositions are given in Figure 2.
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Figure 4: The proportion invested in the different countries for the crisis conscious and crisis
ignorant strategy and a decomposition of the differences for each trading day (numbered consec-
utively) in October 1997 assuming that short sales are not allowed. We assume the investor has a
log utility function. The portfolios are based on the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 and the inferences
presented in Figure 1. The portfolio differences between the two portfolios are decomposed in an
estimation and a crisis effect.
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